ONLINE APPENDIX

Appendix A-1. *Estimates of Chinese development finance to Africa*

Source	**Year**	**Amount per year**	**Flow type**
Bräutigam (2011b)	2009	US$ 1.4B	ODA disbursements
Wang (2007)	2004-2005	US$ 1-1.5B	ODA
The Economist (2004)	2002	US$ 1.8B	Development aid
Lum et al. (2009)	2007	US$ 17.96B	PRC aid (largely provided as concessional Exim Bank loans)
Christensen (2010)	2009	US$ 2.1B	Aid (external assistance and Exim Bank loans)
Lancaster (2007)	2007	US$ 582-875M*	Aid
He (2006)	1956-2006	US$ 109.8M	Aid
Kurlantzick (2006)	2004	US$ 2.7B	Aid
Fitch Ratings (2011)	2001-2010	US$ 6.72B	Exim Bank loans
Alden and Alves (2009)	2006	US$ 12-15B	Exim Bank loans
Harman (2007)	2006	US$ 12.5B	Exim Bank loans
Christensen (2010)	2009	US$ 375M	Debt relief

* Authors' calculations based on mid-point of the estimated range of total Chinese aid ($1.5-2B), and the estimated range of financing in Africa (33%-50%).

Sources:

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Appendix A-2. *List of the 20 largest projects (in millions of US$), 2000-2011*

Recipient	Year	Project	Flow Class	Flow	Status	Value
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2007	Infrastructure for mines barter deal (Sicomines)	OOF-like	Loan	Implementation	7160
Ghana	2010	China offers 6 billion USD concessionary loan	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	5485
Ghana	2009	3 billion USD loan from China Development Bank for oil project, road project, others	OOF-like	Loan	Implementation	3000
Equatorial Guinea	2006	$2b oil-backed loan	OOF-like	Loan	Completion	2692
Ethiopia	2009	Concessional Ex-Im Bank Loan for Dam Construction	Vague (OF)	Loan	Pipeline: Commitment	2249
South Africa	2011	Financial Cooperation Agreement	Vague (OF)	Vague	Pipeline: Commitment	2072
Africa, regional	2000	$1 billion of African debt cancelled; may not be bilateral	ODA-like	Debt forgiveness	Completion	1697
Angola	2004	Phase 1 of National Rehabilitation Project	OOF-like	Loan	Implementation	1507
Sudan	2007	Construction of railway from Khartoum to Port Sudan	OOF-like	Export credits	Completion	1377
Angola	2009	1.2 billion USD loan for agricultural development	OOF-like	Loan	Implementation	1200
Zimbabwe	2004	ZESA Secures Funding for Lake Kariba Power Plant	Vague (OF)	Loan	Pipeline: Commitment	1010
Zambia	2010	Chinese firm to build Kafue Gorge power plant	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	930
Sudan	2003	Loan for Hydro-Mechanic Components of the Merowe hydroelectric power station	Vague (OF)	Loan	Completion	836
Mauritius	2009	East-West Corridor, Ring Road, Bus Way, and Harbour Bridge	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	782
Cameroon	2009	Loan for water distribution project	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	775
Mozambique	2009	China builds Agricultural Research Center/Agriculture Station	ODA-like	In-kind Grant	Completion	700
Cameroon	2003	Memve'ele Dam	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	674
Nigeria	2006	Light Rail Network	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	673
Ethiopia	2006	Master Loan Program for Development Projects Phase I	Vague (OF)	Loan	Implementation	673
Egypt	2006	Cairo International Convention Center Loan	Vague (OF)	Loan	Pipeline: Commitment	673



Appendix A-3. *Chinese official finance over time by sector, 2000-2011*
Note: See Appendix B-1 for list of aid sectors



Appendix A-4. *Number of Chinese ODA projects by sector, 2000-2011*



Appendix A-5. *Monetary amount of Chinese ODA by sector, 2000-2011*



Appendix A-6. *Chinese official finance over time by recipient country, 2000-2011*

Note: See Appendix B-2 for list of countries. AidData did not track any project in Burkina Faso, the Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland over the 2000-2011 period.

Appendix B-1. *List of aid sectors*

Code	**Sector**
110	Education
120	Health
130	Population policies/Programmes and reproductive health
140	Water supply and sanitation
150	Government and civil society
160	Other social infrastructure and services
210	Transport and storage
220	Communications
230	Energy generation and supply
240	Banking and financial services
250	Business and other services
310	Agriculture, forestry and fishing
320	Industry, mining and construction
330	Trade and tourism
410	General environmental protection
420	Women
430	Other multisector
510	General budget support
520	Developmental food aid/Food security assistance
530	Non-food commodity assistance
600	Action relating to debt
700	Emergency response
920	Support to (non-)governmental organisations
998	Unallocated/Unspecified
110	Education
120	Health
130	Population policies/Programmes and reproductive health
140	Water supply and sanitation

Source: OECD-DAC website.

Appendix B-2. *List of countries covered by this study*

Code	**Country**	**Code**	**Country**
AGO	Angola	MAR	Morocco
BDI	Burundi	MDG	Madagascar
BEN	Benin	MLI	Mali
BFA	Burkina Faso	MOZ	Mozambique
BWA	Botswana	MRT	Mauritania
CAF	Central African Rep.	MUS	Mauritius
CIV	Cote D'Ivoire	MWI	Malawi
CMR	Cameroon	NAM	Namibia
COD	Congo, Dem. Rep.	NER	Niger
COG	Congo, Rep.	NGA	Nigeria
COM	Comoros	RWA	Rwanda
CPV	Cape Verde	SDN	Sudan
DJI	Djibouti	SEN	Senegal
DZA	Algeria	SLE	Sierra Leone
EGY	Egypt	SOM	Somalia
ERI	Eritrea	SSD	South Sudan
ETH	Ethiopia	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
GAB	Gabon	SWZ	Swaziland
GHA	Ghana	SYC	Seychelles
GIN	Guinea	TCD	Chad
GMB	Gambia	TGO	Togo
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	TUN	Tunisia
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	TZA	Tanzania
KEN	Kenya	UGA	Uganda
LBR	Liberia	ZAF	South Africa
LBY	Libya	ZMB	Zambia
LSO	Lesotho	ZWE	Zimbabwe

APPENDIX C. *Challenges associated with media-based data collection*

Political scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers, and computer scientists have used open-source and media-based data collection methodologies to track violent and non-violent conflict incidents; document the scale, scope, and impact of natural and man-made disasters; and study patterns of political interaction and sentiment (Schrodt and Gerner 1994; King and Lowe 2003; Shellman 2008; Leetaru 2010; Raleigh et al. 2010; Yonamine and Schrodt 2011; EM-DAT 2014; Salehyan et al. 2012). The nature of media-based data collection, in particular, presents several unique challenges for data completeness, accuracy, quality, and credibility (Woolley 2000; Reeves et al. 2006). First, as with any social scientific inquiry, there is potential for human error by the coder. To reduce the risk of human error, each project in our database received multiple rounds of arbitration, ensuring that each project entry was reviewed by at least two researchers. Second, information extracted from public media outlets is an imperfect substitute for complete and accurate statistical data from official sources. Media-based data collection is only as good as the imperfect data sources upon which it relies. In the absence of official project-level data, there is no foolproof method for adjudicating between conflicting media reports.[1] However, because our methodology pulls from a diverse set of information repositories, researchers were often able to reconcile competing media reports by finding information in government documents, NGO reports, or journal articles. Third, relying on media reports poses a risk of "detection bias," or the risk that countries with lower levels of press freedom are less likely to permit journalists to report on official finance activities from various donors. Similarly, if the motives of media reporting are economic or political in nature, the objectivity and utility of the data are questionable. Among sociologists and scholars who study conflict and terrorism, there is an appreciation for the fact that the use of media reports to identify inherently

[1] However, it is also not the case that official sources are always more credible (and valuable) than media-based information. First, media-based data collection that relies on information regarding the implementation and/or the completion of projects can provide more useful and accurate project-level information than official reports, depending on how official project information is collected, updated and presented. Second, aid data are politically sensitive and might thus be more susceptible to manipulation. In this regard, empirical evidence in Wallace (forthcoming) suggests caution in the usage of politically sensitive data provided by authoritarian regimes.

political "events" (e.g., political protests, terrorist attacks) introduces a risk of selection bias (e.g., McCarthy et al. 1996; Drakos and Gofas 2006).

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APPENDIX D. *Comparing TUFF with existing data sources*

In order to preliminarily gauge the comprehensiveness of our data, we compared them with four existing data sources of Chinese official finance. First, to determine the extent to which our data match the (admittedly limited) data on Chinese aid from official sources, we cross-checked our project records with the project records reported in China's MOFCOM Yearbooks from 2000-2005 (with the exception of 2002 when no data were reported). Matching our data to MOFCOM Yearbooks proved difficult, as the Yearbooks report project completion years while our database records project commitment years and then follows up on whether projects have been implemented and/or completed. That said, the results from the matching exercise suggest that our database contains more projects listed in MOFCOM Yearbooks for more recent years. This makes sense because commitment years for earlier projects have a higher probability of occurring before 2000—our data collection cut-off date. We matched 13% of MOFCOM projects completed in 2000, 20% in 2001, 55% in 2003, 66% in 2004, and 50% in 2005.

Second, we cross-checked our database with humanitarian aid data recorded in the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). While our dataset contains 94 official finance projects coded as "Developmental Food Aid/Food Security Assistance" and "Emergency response" in the 2000-2012 period, FTS contains only 26 humanitarian assistance project records that would plausibly meet our database inclusion criteria. Of the 21 FTS records that contain sufficient information for our comparison, 14 (66%) can be matched to a specific project in our dataset. This suggests that we are collecting more comprehensive and detailed Chinese humanitarian assistance data than FTS.

Third, we have compared our dataset with the Food Aid Information System (FAIS), an online database provided by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) that tracks international food aid flows. Results were mixed. On one hand, we found that FAIS reported over 40 recipient-year pairings with food aid from China that did not exist in our database. But we also found 12 pairings in our dataset that were not in the FAIS database. There were 17 pairings that showed up in both databases. However, FAIS only

reports Chinese food aid to 30 African states, excluding a substantial number of recipients for which AidData has food aid records. The AidData-FAIS matching results suggest that our methodology may not be as effective for collecting food aid data as it is for tracking Chinese foreign aid in other sectors. But FAIS also seems to suffer from substantial data gaps in reporting Chinese food aid to African countries. Taken together, these comparisons with MOFCOM Yearbooks, FTS and FAIS suggest that open source data are no substitute for official data but a viable second-best solution, particularly when official data are largely incomplete.

Fourth, we cross-checked a database of incoming aid flows managed by Malawi's Ministry of Finance. Malawi's Aid Management Platform contains data from 30 donor agencies and US$ 5.3 billion in commitments (current US$), representing approximately 80% of all external funding reported to the Ministry of Finance since 2000. Out of 2,584 projects in the AMP Malawi database, only two records (2008 and 2009 project) list the People's Republic of China as the donor entity, totaling US$ 133 million (current US$). Both of these projects are included in our dataset. However, our dataset includes 21 additional Chinese official finance projects in Malawi, totaling US$ 195 million in commitments. Collectively, these projects more than double the amount of recorded commitments of Chinese official finance in Malawi. This comparison illustrates the added value of using TUFF as another method to track aid flows in the absence of official project records.

In addition to comparisons with these four official databases, we compare the annual amount of total Chinese aid to Africa, as represented by our new dataset, and estimates from previous studies (see Appendix A-1). Our dataset contains 1128 "ODA-like" project IDs with an aggregate value of US$ 24.05 billion (in constant 2009 US$). The 1128 figure includes projects identified as being in the "Commitment," "Implementation," or "Completion" stages, and excludes projects with a status of "Pledge." This is an average of less than US$ 1.85 billion of Chinese ODA to Africa per annum during the thirteen year study range. This is roughly comparable to previous studies such as Bräutigam (2011), Wang (2007) and The Economist (2004) that estimated Chinese ODA to Africa to be somewhere between

US$ 1 and US$ 2 billion for a particular year in our study's time range. More broadly, our database contains 1,687 projects that have been classified as "Chinese Official Finance," which includes projects labeled as "ODA-like," "OOF-like" and "Vague Official Finance," for a total of US$ 84.8 billion between 2000-2012, or US$ 6.52 billion per year. This estimate falls in between previous wide-ranging estimates such as the CRS/NYU Wagner School study that placed 2007 Chinese "aid and related activities" at US$ 18.0 billion (Lum et al. 2009), and Christensen (2010), who estimated 2009 Chinese "aid" to Africa at US$ 2.1 billion.

Our aggregate estimates must be considered in light of two important caveats. First, we not only include data for completed Chinese aid projects, but also for projects in the commitment stage that have been announced or remain in the preparation/design phase but have not necessarily broken ground, as well as for projects for which implementation is underway but that have not been reported as completed. The total values for Chinese official finance are considerably smaller when we exclude projects that lack information that they have been finalized (US$ 22.04 billion over the 2000-2012 period) or have at least been started (US$ 41.9 billion). Second, 36% of the official finance records in our database lack financial values. It therefore stands to reason that we may have under-estimated Chinese official development flows to Africa in this paper as a result. We hope to fill in as many of these missing financial values as possible in future updates to the dataset.[2] To obtain more accurate estimations of the total monetary value of China's development finance, future research should elaborate ways to impute missing monetary values of individual projects based on their observed characteristics.

[2] To this end, we have created a web-based platform available online at china.aiddata.org to solicit better information about Chinese aid and investment projects and programs.

APPENDIX E. *Robustness checks*

We perform several robustness checks to ensure the validity of our findings discussed above. First and most importantly, the existing cross-country literature on conflict raises the possibility that our variables of interest are endogenous to armed conflict. In the analysis so far we have lagged our measures of Chinese development finance to mitigate these concerns. As an alternative to simply lagging our variable of interest, we use an instrumental-variable strategy to make a (modest) attempt to address endogeneity. It is arguably difficult to find a suitable instrument for aid shocks (or aid flows in general). As Nielsen et al. (2011: Appendix A9) explain, they "abandoned the IV strategy because either the instruments were not significantly correlated with aid shocks or they violated the crucial exclusion restriction." We agree that it is difficult to find a suitable instrument for 'traditional' aid flows, but suggest an instrument for the Chinese case: a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if a country has established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Republic of China) rather than (the People's Republic of) China in a given year (data from Rich 2009). A country's stance towards the One-China Policy is an important determinant of access to Chinese funds (Dreher and Fuchs forthcoming). A downside of this instrument is that most of the variation is between rather than within countries during the period of our sample.[3]

In addition to being relevant, a valid instrument must also meet the exclusion restriction. The most obvious channel through which Chinese aid could potentially influence the onset of conflict is through its impact on trade (since an economic contraction could hasten the onset of a conflict and an economic expansion could forestall conflict, see Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Miguel et al. 2004; and de Ree and Nillesen 2009); however, recent research suggests that diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is not a statistically significant predictor of trade with African countries (Johnston et al. 2014). As it is hard to identify a channel other than Chinese funds through which the question of Taiwan recognition could affect conflict onset in African countries, we have strong reasons to believe that this dummy variable is a suitable instrument.

[3] Over the 2000-2005 period, the African countries that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the one China are Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Liberia (until 2003), Malawi, Senegal, Sao Tomé and Principe, and Swaziland.

In order to run our interacted model with an instrumental-variables strategy, one would need at least three instruments (one for each variable). As we do not have a suitable instrument for aid shocks (and the interaction term), we run a linear probability model with aid shocks and Chinese funds without interaction. We then show in a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation that the Taiwan recognition variable is a relevant predictor of Chinese funds, as suggested by the Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments for the specifications using the number of OF projects and ODA projects, respectively (F>10). Our results in Online Appendix E-1 for the measures based on project numbers show a significant negative effect of these flows, instrumented by Taiwan recognition, on conflict onset.[4] This evidence is generally in line with a conflict-mitigating effect of Chinese funds under 'traditional' aid shocks. We take this as evidence supporting the existence of an actual causal relationship driving our results.

Second, one might argue that controlling for "intermediate outcomes" like riots and instability, which might themselves have been affected by an aid shock, closes important transmission channels.[5] We thus test whether our results hold when we drop the control variables that are most likely to fall into this category (*Human Rights Violations*, *Assassinations*, *Riots*, *General Strikes*, *Antigovernment Demonstrations*, and *Instability*). As can be seen in Online Appendix E-2, we obtain a similar pattern as in Figure 4.

Third, while we use cubic splines in our baseline model in line with Nielsen et al. (2011), we now replace them by the time (in years) since the last conflict occurred and its squared and cubic term to test robustness. By doing so, we follow Carter and Signorino (2010) who show that this simplistic approach to account for time dependence outperforms time dummies and is not inferior to the usage of splines. As can be seen from Online Appendix E-3, our findings are robust when we replace cubic splines by t, t^2 and t^3.

Fourth, as the interpretation of an interaction term in a non-linear model is non-trivial (as discussed above), we re-run our regressions using a linear probability model for comparison. Online

[4] The specification using the OF-over-GNI ratio as variable of interest shows the expected sign but does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. This should be interpreted with more caution as the instrument is weaker (F<10).
[5] We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

Appendix E-4 shows a similar pattern as in the original regression. The only noteworthy difference is that the marginal effect of aid shocks becomes significantly negative, but only with a very high influx of Chinese ODA-like projects.

Fifth, we run a linear fixed-effects model. Online Appendix E-5 shows the resulting marginal effects of an aid shock from 'traditional' sources as a function of the availability of Chinese funding. It is reassuring that we still observe a negative slope, while it is not surprising that the fixed-effects results are only marginally significant given the low number of observations (39 African countries over six years).

Finally, we show that our results do not depend on the definition of the aid shock variable. The benchmark definition in Nielsen et al. (2011) is a binary indicator that takes a value of one if the change in the aid-over-GDP ratio (averaged over the last two years) is below the 15th percentile of its level. They acknowledge that this cut-off level is rather arbitrary and hence show results for other cut-off points. Following their approach, we find that our results are robust to defining aid shocks as changes in the aid-over-GDP ratio below the 25th, 20th, and 10th percentile, respectively (see Online Appendices E-6, E-7 and E-8).

Additional references:

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APPENDIX E-1. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (IV regression results)*

	(1) **OLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(2) **OLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(3) **2SLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(4) **OLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(5) **2SLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(6) **OLS 2000-2005 Africa only**	(7) **2SLS 2000-2005 Africa only**
Aid shock	0.162**	0.164**	0.182**	0.168**	0.203***	0.163**	0.054
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.680)
Number of OF projects		-0.008	-0.100*				
		(0.285)	(0.064)				
Number of ODA projects				-0.016	-0.120*		
				(0.247)	(0.053)		
OF amount/GNI						0.001	-0.348
						(0.950)	(0.112)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic splines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	188	188	188	188	188	185	185
Number of countries	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p value)			0.020		0.010		0.079
Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded instruments			12.21		16.49		3.32

Note: See Table 3. The instrument for *aid shocks* is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one if a country has established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Republic of China) rather than (the People's Republic of) China in a given year. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

APPENDIX E-2. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, robustness check with omitted intermediate variables)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-3. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, robustness check with t, t² and t³)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-4. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, linear probability model)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-5. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, linear probability model with country-fixed effects)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-6. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, aid shocks defined at the lowest 25%)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-7. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, aid shocks defined at the lowest 20%)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX E-8. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, aid shocks defined at the lowest 10%)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the lagged number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the lagged number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the lagged monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX F. *Aid shocks, Chinese development finance and conflict onset (average marginal effects, robustness check with Chinese aid variables not being lagged by one year)*



Note: The figure depicts the average marginal effect of an aid shock on the likelihood of conflict onset (and its 90% confidence interval), based on modified regressions of Table 3. Panel (a) refers to the number of Chinese official finance project commitments (column 5 of Table 3), (b) the number of Chinese ODA-like project commitments (column 6), and (c) the monetary value of Chinese official finance project commitments as a share of recipient GNI (column 7).

APPENDIX G. *Acknowledgements*

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